The Case of the Knowledge Economy by Foss, Nicolai J.
(9667 words) 
Misesian Ownership and Coasian Authority in 
Hayekian Settings: The Case of the  
Knowledge Economy 
 
Nicolai J Foss 
LINK 
Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy 
Copenhagen Business School 
Howitzvej 60; 2000 Frederiksberg; Denmark 
njf.ivs@cbs.dk  
 
Revised draft, 2 July, 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
I critically discuss a number of recent and increasingly influential claims 
about economic organization in the “knowledge economy.” The relevant 
claims are that traditional authority relations will tend to disappear, the 
boundaries of the firm will blur, and coordination mechanisms will be 
very malleable (resulting in various “new organizational forms”).  In order 
to get an analytical focus on the knowledge economy, I assume that it may 
be approximated by “Hayekian settings” (after Hayek 1945), that is, 
settings in which knowledge is distributed and where knowledge inputs 
are relatively more important in production than physical capital inputs.  I 
then argue, drawing on organizational economics as well as Mises’ 
insights in property rights and comparative systems, that the presence of 
Hayekian settings does not mean that authority will disappear, etc.  Thus, 
Misesian insights help to resurrect the Coasian firm against attacks 
inspired by Hayek’s writings on knowledge.  
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 I. Introduction 
The present paper is taken up with the dynamics of economic organization.  In 
particular, it critically discusses much recent work which has asserted that economic 
organization ⎯ in particular, the boundaries of firms, internal organization and 
corporate governance ⎯ will undergo major transformative changes as a result of 
the emergence of the so-called “knowledge economy,” a term much fancied by 
business administration and management scholars (e.g., Prusak 1997; Neef 1998). 
An Austrian perspective is a particularly fitting starting point for such an exercise.    
Surely, Austrian economists ⎯ who have always been occupied with analyzing the 
discovery, dispersion and use of knowledge ⎯ will not be surprised to learn that we 
live in a knowledge economy.  To Austrians, all economies are, in a broad sense, 
“knowledge economies.”  This calls for clarification of the concept.  However, like 
its (somewhat overlapping, but non-identical) “new economy” counterpart in 
economics, the knowledge economy notion covers many different phenomena,1 and 
as in the case of the new economy, the evidence for these phenomena is somewhat 
scant, perhaps contrary to the impression provided by the considerable media (and 
some academic) hype. Recent research have established that some of changes 
usually packed into the notion, notably changes in the composition of the labor 
force (e.g., Tomlinson 1999) and some kinds of organizational changes (e.g., 
Ichniowski et al. 1996; Laursen and Foss 2002) appear to be very real ones, while 
evidence for other kinds of changes is perhaps less convincing. 
 However, the present paper is agnostic on the descriptive accuracy and 
significance of the full notion of the knowledge economy.  The aim of the paper is to 
discuss, from an Austrian point view, economic organization in settings where 
rapid changes in the external environment necessitate a high degree of 
organizational decentralization and “empowerment” of employees, where relations 
to outside knowledge sources (other firms, universities, etc.) are paramount, and 
where “knowledge assets” account for a large (and increasing) part of value-added 
in production.  While such settings have no doubt existed in some industries for a 
long time, they are not exactly the dominant mode of production that characterizes, 
say, American business history for a great part of the 20th century (e.g., Chandler 
1962; Langlois 2001).  However, proponents of the knowledge economy notion 
assert that these settings are becoming increasingly prevalent in today’s business 
landscape, in the sense that an increasing fraction of firms experiment with 
decentralizing their internal structures, build relations to external knowledge 
sources, etc.  For the sake of argument, these parts of the knowledge economy 
                                                          
1  These include, on the organization side, a shrinking of corporate boundaries and new ways of 
structuring these, falling firm sizes, and a flattening of internal organization (e.g., Mendelsson 
and Pillai 1999; Helper, MacDuffie and Sabel 2000)); increased differentiation of tastes on the 
demand side (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts 1990); acceleration of innovation and technological 
development on the supply side (D’Aveni 1994); and changes in the composition of labor on the 
input side (Tomlinson 1999). 
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notion shall be accepted in this paper. The question then is what drives such 
changes.  
 In order to understand this, many of those who have addressed economic 
organization in the knowledge economy have explicitly drawn upon Austrian ⎯ 
more precisely, Hayekian ⎯ ideas on the need for decentralization fostered by the 
presence of dispersed knowledge.2  They have used such Austrian ideas to argue 
that hierarchy and planning methods are as problematic inside firms as they have 
proved to be outside firms, that firms need to harness the ability of markets to 
utilize, exchange and build information rapidly in response to changing 
contingencies, and that extensive delegation of decision rights and the use of high-
powered incentives to support this are imperative. Fundamental changes with 
respect to IT innovations, internationalization, deregulation, increasing emphasis on 
shareholder value maximization, changes in the composition of the labor force, etc. 
have arguably made these Austrian principles of organizational design increasingly 
pressing.  Perhaps not surprising, in many recent writings on all this, there is a 
strong and marked opposition to the central analytical dichotomy between planned 
firms and unplanned markets that is present not only in Coase (1937) and 
Williamson (1996), but also in central Austrian contributions such as Mises (1936, 
1944, 1949) and Hayek (1973).3  Thus, it is argued that only those firms that emulate 
markets inside their internal organization to the largest possible extent will survive 
and prosper in the knowledge economy (Cowen and Parker 1997).  The “Coasian 
firm,” characterized by well-defined boundaries, authority, etc. will, in contrast, 
wither.     
 It is these ideas that the present paper critically takes issue with.  In particular 
(but not exclusively), I focus on internal organization issues.  Like a number of 
recent contributors, I discuss the implications for internal organization of the 
Hayekian notion that the dispersed and subjective character of relevant knowledge 
is a strongly binding constraint on the use of planned coordination.  However, I 
argue that it does not follow that firms should emulate markets as far as possible. In 
his critique of market socialism, Mises (1949) pointed to the folly of “playing 
markets,” and I draw on his overall argument that bringing coordination 
mechanisms characteristic of market organization into a planned organization is 
inherently problematic.  I also draw on Mises’ (1949) related insight that the mixed 
economy is fundamentally unstable, as well as on his insights in property rights and 
ownership (Mises 1936, 1949; Foss 1994a). Mises argued that the economic 
institutions of capitalism are strongly complementary in the sense that 
(unhampered) capitalism is a stable system, consisting of interlocking elements, 
where changes away from pure capitalism will result in serious inefficiencies.  I use 
this fundamental notion to argue that firms are also systems of complementary 
                                                          
2  Examples include Ellig (1993, 1997), Ellig and Gable (1993), Cowen and Parker (1997), Foss 
(1999, 2000), Ghoshal, Moran and Almeida-Costa (1995), Grant (1996), Jensen and Meckling 
(1992), Jensen and Wruck (1994), Hodgson (1998), and Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995). 
3  Cowen and Parker (1997) and Matthews (1998) are particularly outspoken critics of the 
dichotomy. 
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elements and that this fact places constraints on the extent to which firms may be 
made “market-like.”  In particular, I agree with Mises that “[t]he function of the 
entrepreneur cannot be separated from the direction of the employment of factors of 
production for the accomplishment of definite tasks. The entrepreneur controls the 
factors of production” (Mises 1949: 306). The “direction” and “control” undertaken 
by “the entrepreneur” is qualitatively different from allocation by means of the 
price mechanism, since it relies on authority that is backed up by the entrepreneur’s 
ownership of the alienable (non-human) means of production.  In other words, 
Misesian arguments are used to criticize arguments derived from Hayekian insights 
that firms should emulate markets to the largest possible extent.  In a sense, 
Misesian arguments resurrect the Austrian and Coasian notion that markets and 
hierarchies are indeed different mechanisms for resource allocation; hence, the title 
of the paper.4
 
II. Economic Organization in the Knowledge Economy: 
Interpreting Recent Arguments 
Economic Organization in the Knowledge Economy: Some Recent Arguments 
 To repeat, the notion of the knowledge economy is used (and accepted) here to 
cover ongoing changes in the business landscape, such as the increase in the relative 
numbers of firms experimenting with decentralizing their internal structures 
(Ichniowski et al. 1996) and building relations to external knowledge sources 
(Liebeskind et al. 1995; Matusik and Hill 1998), the tendency of knowledge assets to 
account for an increasing share of value-added and physical assets for a decreasing 
share, and the changing skill composition of the workforce (Tomlinson 1999).  
Numerous writers have argued that tasks and activities in the knowledge economy 
need to be coordinated in a manner that is very different from the management of 
traditional manufacturing activities (as portrayed in, e.g., Chandler 1962).  This has  
profound transforming implications for the authority relation and the internal 
organization and boundaries of firms.  For example, Cowen and Parker (1997) 
explain with respect to internal organization that  
Market changes are moving manufacturing farther and farther away from 
steady-state, low variety, long-batch production runs, relevant to Taylorist 
methods, to high variety and small runs … Organizations are adopting 
new forms of decentralization to cope with the instability, uncertainty, and 
pace of change of the market-place … In cluster of network working, 
employees of undifferentiated rank may operate temporarily on a certain 
                                                          
4  Foss (1994b) argued that in many important respects, the Austrians anticipated ideas that have 
become prominent in the modern economics of organization. The arguments developed in the 
present paper go beyond those in Foss (1994b) by putting more stress on Misesian arguments.  
Foss (1993) argued that Coasian insights were largely consistent with an Austrian perspective, 
contrary to Boudreaux and Holcombe (1989).  Klein (1996) is an application of the Misesian 
calculation argument to the issue of the boundaries of the firm, and Klein and Klein (2001) treat 
corporate governance issues in a Misesian manner.  
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task or tasks in teams. The clusters are largely autonomous and engage in 
decentralized decision-making and planning … They are conducive to 
individual initiative (‘intrapreneurship’) and faster decision-taking.  They 
facilitate organizational flexibility. 
A number of writers also argue that firm boundaries will be profoundly affected by 
the emerging knowledge economy.  Specifically, because of the growing importance 
of being able to access knowledge from multiple sources, knowledge-based 
networks (Harryson 2000) increasingly become the relevant dimension for 
understanding the organization of economic activities.  Such networks often cut 
across the legal boundaries of the firm.5
This increased reliance on knowledge networks tends to erode authority-based 
definitions of the boundaries of the firm, because authority increasingly shifts to 
expert individuals who control crucial information resources and may not be 
employees of the firm. As Zucker (1991: 164) argues: 
While bureaucratic authority is by definition located within the firm’s 
boundaries, expert authority depends on the information resources 
available to an individual, and not on the authority of office.  Thus, 
authority may be located within the organization … but when an external 
authority market can provide information that leads to greater 
effectiveness, then authority tends to migrate into the market. 
To the extent that important knowledge assets are increasingly controlled by 
employees (“knowledge workers”) themselves, traditional authority relations are 
fading into insignificance.  This is partly a result of the increased bargaining power 
on the part of knowledge workers (stemming from the control over critical 
knowledge assets), and partly a result of the increasingly specialist nature of 
knowledge work (Hodgson 1998), which makes principals/employers ignorant 
about (some of) the actions that are open to agents/employees.  
 The combined effect of all this is to wreck the traditional economist’s criterion 
of what distinguishes market transactions from hierarchical transactions (Zingales 
2000). Thus, whether direction by means of order giving (Coase 1937; Simon 1951; 
Williamson 1985; Demsetz 1991) and backed up by the ownership of alienable assets 
(Hart and Moore 1990) obtains or not is increasingly irrelevant for understanding the 
organization of economic activities in a knowledge economy (cf. Grandori 2001).  It 
is therefore not surprising that a number of writers are quite explicit that the advent 
of the knowledge economy increasingly questions the relevance of Coasian 
organizational economics (e.g., Boisot 1998; Helper, MacDuffie and Sabel 2000).  
Thus, Cowen and Parker (1997: 15; emphasis in original) argue that  
                                                          
5  The underlying comparative-institutional argument is that networks are particularly useful 
organizational arrangements for sourcing and transferring knowledge because the costs of 
pricing knowledge (in a market) or transferring it (in a hierarchy) often exceed the costs of 
transmitting knowledge within an informal network (Powell 1990: 304; Liebeskind et al. 1995: 
7). 
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… firms and markets are not exactly the same, but rather they differ in 
empirical terms.  They refer to different means of organizing economic 
activity, albeit means that do not differ substantially in kind. … This … view 
does not seek to find a clear-cut distinction between firms and markets.  
Rather the difference  between the firm and the market as a resource 
allocator involves what might more usefully be viewed as subtle 
differences relating to contracting.6
It is easy to see that the above arguments go right to the heart of the crucial and 
perennial issues in the theory of economic organization.  However, before it is 
possible to provide a response, it is necessary to understand on what basis one may 
put forward such arguments.  Austrian economics is a particularly fitting starting 
point for such an exercise.   
Economic Organization in Hayekian Settings 
 It is no coincidence that so many of those who write on economic organization 
in the emerging knowledge economy cite Hayek’s work, particularly his 1945 paper, 
“The Use of Knowledge in Society”; indeed, much of what these writers are up to 
may be understood as an attempt to examine the implications of that particular 
paper for the theory of the firm (cf. Ghoshal, Moran and Almeida 1995; Nonaka and 
Takeuchi 1995). In particular, writers inspired by Austrian economics have analyzed 
the implications of the knowledge economy for firm organization in terms of the 
planning problems posed by Hayekian dispersed knowledge becoming increasingly 
pressing for firms (Cowen and Parker 1997). Coping with the problem posed by 
Hayekian distributed knowledge has moved from being a problem for socialist 
managers and dirigiste bureaucrats to also being a problem confronted by managers 
of (at least large) firms in capitalist economies.   
 Two key claims (or, “stylized facts”) ⎯ which may both be characterized as 
Hayekian in spirit ⎯ are present in recent work on economic organization in the 
knowledge economy.  The first claim is that because of the increased need for firms 
to source diverse, specialized knowledge in production, knowledge, as seen from 
the point of view of a manager, is becoming increasingly dispersed in the sense of 
Hayek (1945).  In other words, why such knowledge is not possessed by any single 
mind, it is still necessary to somehow mobilize it for the carrying out of a 
productive task or a complex of such tasks.7   The second claim is that because of the 
increased importance of sourcing specialist knowledge, knowledge assets 
controlled by individual agents (“knowledge workers”) are becoming increasingly 
important in production (e.g., Boisot 1998; Hodgson 1998) in the sense of accounting 
for a greater part of the value-added of goods.   In the following, I refer to situations 
in which these two claims are descriptively adequate as “Hayekian settings.”  
                                                          
6  This quotation echoes earlier statements by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Cheung (1983), 
reinforced by Hayekian considerations.  
7  This argument is made explicitly by, for example, Ghoshal, Moran and Almeida-Costa (1995),  
Hodgson (1998), and Coombs and Metcalfe (2000), 
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 One possible interpretation of the recent literature on economic organization 
in the knowledge economy is that as Hayekian settings become increasingly 
prevalent, traditional authority relations vanish (Zucker 1991; Hodgson 1998); the 
boundaries of firms blur because of the increasing importance of knowledge 
networks that transcend those boundaries; and coordination mechanisms (i.e., 
authority, norms, teams, prices, etc.) will increasingly be combined in new, 
innovative ways ⎯ resulting in what is often referred as “new organizational 
forms,” and substituting for traditional relations of authority. This final claim 
implies that organizational forms do not cluster in a few rigid, discrete forms, but, 
on the contrary, that coordination mechanisms are highly malleable (e.g., Grandori 
1997; Helper, MacDuffie and Sabel 2000). In particular, firms may adopt 
coordination mechanisms that we normally think of as characteristic of the market 
rather than of planned coordination, in particular pricing, entrepreneurial control 
over resources, and high-powered incentives (Miles et al. 1997).  In the following, I 
interpret and discuss some of these arguments.  It is convenient to begin with a 
discussion of the meaning of authority.  
The Hayekian Challenge to Economic Organization   
 To most economists, Coase’s (1937) discussion, supplemented with a later 
contribution by Simon (1951), still provides the working definition of authority. In 
Coase (1937: 242), the employment contract is explained as  
… one whereby the factor, for a certain remuneration (which may be fixed 
or fluctuating) agrees to obey the directions of an entrepreneur within 
certain limits.  The essence of the power is that it should only state the 
limits to the powers of the entrepreneur.  Within these limits, he can 
therefore direct the other factors of production.  
This contractually agreed upon right to “direct the other factors of production” is, of 
course, authority.  Much debate in economics has concerned the sources of authority 
(e.g., Alchian and Demsetz 1972; Cheung 1983; Hart 1995). In other words, why 
exactly is it that the employee accepts to be directed when human capital cannot be 
traded?8  However, in Hayekian settings, other questions ⎯ which have been much 
less discussed ⎯ are just as pertinent.  Thus, if in Hayekian settings, the employer 
does not possess full knowledge of the employee’s action set (i.e., the actions that he 
can take when uncertainty is resolved), or if the employee is better informed than 
the employer with respect to how certain tasks should (optimally) be carried out, or 
if employees control knowledge assets that are “within their heads” and which may 
give them substantial bargaining power, what happens to the Coasian notion of 
authority as direction?  It is easy to conclude that under these circumstances, 
                                                          
8  Thus, to writers such as Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Cheung (1983), it is not meaningful to 
assume that an employer can force an employee to do what the employer wants in the absence 
of coercion. As Alchian and Demsetz (1972) argue, an implication of this view is that the 
distinction between the authority-based and the price-based modes of allocation emphasized by 
Coase (1937) is superficial.  Note that this “nexus of contracts” position is remarkably close to 
the position that in a knowledge-based economy, the firm/market boundary is unclear and the 
notion of authority elusive at best. 
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Coasian authority simply is not a workable mechanism for allocating resources (and 
some writers appear to have explicitly adopted this position, e.g., Grandori 1997), 
for the basic reason that this notion seems to assume that a directing employer is at 
least as knowledgeable about the relevant tasks as the employee being directed.   
 It has recently been argued, in response to Alchian and Demsetz (1972), that 
ultimately the source of authority is ownership of assets (Hart 1995).  If an employer 
has the power to deprive a worker of access to assets (to which he may have become 
specialized), the employer obtains bargaining power that forms the backbone of the 
authority he can exercise over the employee.   At the same time, this provides a 
theory of the boundaries of the firm, since these may be defined in terms of 
ownership of assets.  The assets that in this line of thought confer authority are 
alienable assets.   However, as numerous writers have emphasized, an important 
aspect of the knowledge economy is precisely that physical assets are of strongly 
waning importance (e.g., Boisot 1998).  Of course, the implication is that ownership 
over such assets is an increasingly ineffective source of bargaining power and that, 
therefore, authority must wane as bargaining power increasingly becomes more 
symmetrically distributed over the owners of knowledge assets.  Since the 
boundaries of the firm are (also) defined in terms of legally recognized ownership to 
the firm’s alienable, primarily physical, assets, and since such assets are of declining 
economic and commercial importance, it is obvious that the very notion of the firm’s 
boundaries is becoming increasingly fuzzy, and perhaps even irrelevant. 
 Finally, because authority declines in importance as knowledge becomes 
distributed and knowledge inputs increase in importance, resort to other 
coordination mechanisms is necessary.  Thus, firms increasingly rely on high-
powered incentives, implement employee stock-ownership programs, invest in 
building “corporate cultures,” try to price corporate resources to the largest possible 
extent, etc.  An outcome of this is the emergence of “new organizational forms.”  
The theoretical implication is that various mechanisms for coordinating resources 
are combine to a much larger extent than hitherto assumed in, for example, 
organizational economics, where economic activities are normally assumed to be 
organized across three discrete governance structures, firms, markets, and hybrids 
(e.g., Williamson 1996). 
 In sum,  arguments can be made that Hayekian settings, where knowledge is 
distributed and knowledge inputs are more important than physical capital inputs,  
present real problems for the exercise of authority in firms, make the boundaries of 
firms blur, and remove many of the constraints on the malleability of coordination 
mechanisms.   The following section discusses the reach of these arguments.  
III. Authority, Firm Boundaries and Complementary 
Coordination Mechanisms in Hayekian Settings  
In this section, I assume that Hayekian settings obtain and discuss the implications 
of such settings for the Coasian themes of authority, the boundaries of the firm, and 
the combinability of coordination mechanisms.  The underlying perspective is 
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Misesian, in the sense that I shall throughout assume the existence of a speculating 
entrepreneur.  The entrepreneur is ultimately in charge of the business venture in 
the sense that he determines “… the general plan for the utilization of resources” 
(Mises 1949: 303), hires the managers and “technicians, i.e., people who have the 
ability and skill to perform definite kinds and quantities of work” (idem.), 
determines “… the expansion and contraction of the size of the business and its 
main sections,” as well as “the enterprise’s financial structure” (1949: 307), and 
acquires ownership of the firm’s alienable assets.  Nobody denies that in the 
emerging knowledge economy, there will still be a need for such enterprising 
agents.  On the contrary, many recent writings on the knowledge economy very 
strongly stress entrepreneurship (e.g., Miles et al. 1997).  What is being claimed is 
rather, as we have seen, that the entrepreneur will no longer be able to exercise 
much authority, that the boundaries of his venture will become ill-defined (if not in 
a formal, legal sense, then in an economic and commercial), and that his venture can 
rely on all sorts of combinations of coordination mechanisms, in particular that he 
can offer employees incentives that in terms of their strength (i.e., the way in which 
they link effort and rewards/punishment) are very close to the incentives provided 
under market contracting, effectively mimicking the effects of market pricing.  I 
discuss the three issues of authority, boundaries and malleability of coordination 
mechanisms seriatim. 
Authority in Hayekian Settings 
 In this section, the strategy is to examine the role of authority in Hayekian 
settings.  Since I later discuss the importance for economic organization of the 
distinction between physical and knowledge assets, I here only concentrate on the 
dispersed knowledge aspect of Hayekian settings.   One way of doing this is to 
focus on “hidden knowledge” (Minkler 1993) in relations between a principal (e.g., 
the Misesian entrepreneur) and an agent (e.g., a hired manager).   That is, it will be 
assumed that the problem facing a principal is not just that he is uninformed about 
what state of nature has been revealed or of the realization of the agent’s effort (i.e., 
hidden information), as in the usual agency model (Holmström 1979), but that the 
agent’s knowledge is superior to that of the principal with respect to certain 
production possibilities (i.e., hidden knowledge).  The principal may be ignorant 
about some members of the set of possible actions open to the agent, or the agent 
may be better informed than the employer with respect to how certain tasks should 
(optimally) be carried out, or both. As I shall argue, it is possible to explain the 
presence of authority in such a setting, in the sense of it being rational to give one 
agent decision-making power over another one.  I discuss the rationales for this 
under the headings of “the need for urgent coordination,” “decisive information,” 
“economies of scale in decision-making,”, and “defining incentive systems.”  
 The Need for Urgent Coordination. While Hayek (1945) did much to identify 
the benefits of the price system in the context of alienable property rights in coping 
with distributed knowledge and unexpected disturbances, he arguably neglected 
those situations where efficiency requires that adaptation be “coordinated” rather 
than “autonomous” (Williamson 1996). Coordinated adaptation or action may be 
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required when actions or activities are complementary (Milgrom and Roberts 1990; 
Kirsten Foss 2001), for example, when it is important to make some urgent choice 
(possibly highly inefficient), because doing nothing is worse.  In such cases, it may  
be better to have somebody pick a strategy and make everybody play this strategy,      
if the inefficiencies from picking a bad strategy are smaller than the inefficiencies 
from delaying a coordinated solution.  In the context of a specific model of this 
trade-off, Bolton and Farrell conclude that “… the less important the private 
information that the planner lacks and the more essential coordination is, the more 
attractive the central planning solution is” (1990: 805).  Moreover, the decentralized 
solution performs poorly if urgency is important.  Centralization is assumed to not 
involve delay and therefore is a good mechanism for dealing with emergencies, a 
conclusion Bolton and Farrell argue is consistent with the observed tendencies of 
firms to rely on centralized authority in cases of emergencies.  
 Decisive Information.  Even under distributed knowledge, where the 
centralized decision-maker per definition does not possess (at least some) local 
information, he may in many cases still hold the information that is decisive.  
Loosely, information is (strongly) decisive if ⎯ in a setting involving many 
cooperating individuals ⎯ a decision can reasonably be made on the basis of this 
information without involving other pieces of information (Casson 1994). According 
to Casson (1994), the extent to which a problem involving the knowledge of several 
individuals has decisiveness features and the cost at which knowledge can be 
communicated helps to explain the allocation of decision rights. The general 
principle is that decision rights will tend to be concentrated in the hands of the 
individual who has access to the decisive information, and particularly so the more 
costly it is to communicate this information.   This provides a further argument for 
authority under hidden knowledge.   If the knowledge possessed by, for example, 
managers is not decisive, if the knowledge possessed by the entrepreneur is 
decisive, and if it is costly to communicate the entrepreneur’s knowledge, then 
overall decision rights should be concentrated in the hands of the entrepreneur, that 
is, he should assume ultimate authority in the firm.    
 Economies of Scale in Decision-Making. Demsetz (1988) argues that 
economies of scale in managing are a neglected factor in the explanation of the 
existence of firms and the understanding of authority. However, he does not explain 
the underlying reasoning.  However, the relevant economies may relate both to 
managing the internal relations between agents inside the firm and managing 
relations to outside agents (customers, suppliers, government agencies.  Not only 
may there be scale economies in such activities; there may also be substantial 
learning economies.  Other agents may be happy to let a central agent incur the 
effort costs of negotiating, learning about potential suppliers, etc., and compensate 
him accordingly.    
 Defining Incentive Systems.  It is hard to deny to that Hayekian settings pose 
special problems for the use of monitoring mechanisms and incentive pay (Minkler 
1993; Aghion and Tirole 1997; Foss 1999).  Minkler (1993: 23) argues that “… if the 
worker knows more than the entrepreneur, it is pointless for the entrepreneur to 
monitor the worker,” which implies that to the extent that monitoring is a 
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precondition for the exercise of direction, using the authority mechanism also seems 
to become “pointless.”  However, even under hidden knowledge, there may still be 
a role for authority.  For example, even under hidden knowledge the principal may 
be able to  form conjectures of the financial results that result from the agent’s 
activities and he can check whether these conjectures are actually confirmed using 
the control systems of the firm.  Both Knight (1921), discussing business judgment 
and Mises (1949: 303), discussing the entrepreneur delegating responsibilities to 
managers, clearly allowed for this possibility.  None of them assumed that 
entrepreneurs would have full knowledge of their managers’ action set; still, they 
did assume that the entrepreneur can rationally delegate decisions to managers and 
control these.  Hidden knowledge does not imply that subjective performance 
measurement becomes impossible.  In fact, it may be conjectured that the more we 
depart from simple settings where employees are very easily monitored, and the 
more complicated the control problem becomes, the more likely is it that the 
entrepreneur will choose to rely on multiple incentive instruments to influence 
employee behavior (Holmström and Milgrom 1991).  In a dynamic economy, 
maintaining coherence between such instruments may be a recurrent task.  
Economies of scale may dictate that this activity be centralized. Moreover, 
centralization is required to the extent that externalities arise when the instruments 
are controlled by separate firms and transaction costs hinder the internalization of 
these externalities. Both arguments point towards the centralization of decision 
rights  
 Thus, the above arguments suggest that it is in fact possible to explain 
authority in the sense of possessing rights to somehow direct another agent in the 
context of Hayekian settings. Admittedly, authority understood narrowly as a 
relation in which the employer has superior knowledge and can observe all 
contingencies that require a response by an employee is not consistent with such 
settings.  But firm organization does not at all necessitate this kind of authority 
relation.  The very fact that firms exist is prima facie evidence that they can somehow 
cope with the problems implied by Hayekian settings.9 In turn, this suggests 
economists are well-advised to scrap the narrow understanding of authority with 
which they have typically worked.  
Delegation as a Response to Hayekian Settings 
 The reason that firms can thrive even though their internal organization 
exemplify Hayekian settings is that they have recourse to delegation.10  As Mises 
(1949: 303) emphasized, “… entrepreneurs are not omnipresent.  They cannot 
themselves attend to the manifold tasks which are incumbent upon them.” Mises 
(1949: 305) clearly recognized that in many firms decision rights are allocated by the 
                                                          
9  Of course, there are also offsetting benefits of firm organization, such as the superior ability of 
firms to organize transactions characterized by high-levels of relation-specific investments 
(Williamson 1985, 1996; Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1990).  
10  An alternative mechanism is to suppress Hayekian settings as possible by discouraging local 
initiative, indoctrinating employees harshly, and operating with rigid routines and operating 
procedures.  In a dynamic economy, this is, however, bound to lead to financial disaster. 
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entrepreneur (and the board of directors) to lower levels, presumably in order to 
better cope with distributed knowledge, an insight that is not present in Coase 
(1937).  He perceptively recognized that delegation leads to agency problems, but 
argued that the system of double-entry bookkeeping and other control measures may 
partly cope with such problems. Mises also understood that delegation of decision 
rights is circumscribed in an attempt to cope with the control problem that follows 
from delegation.11  
 In the Misesian scheme, an organizational equilibrium obtains where decision 
rights are delegated in such a way that the benefits of delegation in terms of better 
utilizing local knowledge are balanced against the costs of delegation in terms of 
agency losses (as in Jensen and Meckling 1992).  This provides a useful perspective 
on many of those new organizational forms that are argued to be characteristic of 
the knowledge economy (cf. Cowen and Parker 1997), such as team-organization, 
“molecular forms”, and other manifestations of organizational delegation and 
decentralization: These are prompted by a market-driven pressure to delegate 
decision rights (e.g., to better serve customer preferences) and structure reward 
schemes in such a way that optimal tradeoffs are reached.  Thus, decision rights are 
delegated inside firms, but they are delegated as means to an end (Hayek 1973), 
their use is monitored (Jensen and Meckling 1992), and top-management reserves 
ultimate decision rights for itself (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 2000).   
 This underscores the argument made earlier that authority in the sense of 
direction and centralized decision-making ⎯ which, as Mises emphasized, does not 
require detailed knowledge about a subordinate’s knowledge or available actions ⎯ 
may persist in Hayekian settings.  Per implication, even in “knowledge-based” 
firms, there may be a need for centralized coordination.  As I shall argue next, when 
there is such a need, it is often efficient to centralize ownership to alienable assets.  
In turn, this suggests that centralized coordination is a feature of firms rather than 
markets.   
Ownership and the Boundaries of Firms 
 So far, not much has been said about what backs up authority, although it has 
been hinted at that ownership may play a key role here. The purpose of the present 
section is to go more into ownership issues, and therefore the issue of the 
boundaries of the firm.  The argument that will be critically discussed is that as 
knowledge assets become relatively more important in production, the boundaries 
of firms will blur, at least to the extent that these are defined in terms of legally 
recognized ownership of the firm’s alienable assets.  The work of Oliver Hart and 
others (Hart 1995, 1996; Hart and Moore 1990) — called the incomplete-contracts 
literature — offers a possible approach to this issue.  The incomplete contracts 
approach is a thoroughly neoclassical approach, not an Austrian one.  However, it 
has some features that makes complementary to a Misesian perspective, notably the 
                                                          
11  For example, the right to use an asset in certain ways may be delegated; however, it is 
understood that that right does not entail the right to, for example, use the asset in the service of 
a competitor firm. 
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emphasis on ownership as backing up authority, the argument that the boundaries 
of the firm lies where the entrepreneur’s ownership of alienable assets stops, and 
the implication that the entrepreneur assumes his directing role because his inputs 
to the venture are those that matter the most for the total monetary surplus. 
 In the Hart approach, two kinds of assets are distinguished, namely alienable 
(i.e., non-human) and non-alienable (i.e., human) assets.  The basic distinction 
between an independent contractor and an employee, that is, between an inter-firm 
and an intra-firm transaction, now turns on who owns the alienable assets that an 
agent (whether independent or employee) utilizes in his work. An independent 
contractor owns his tools etc., while an employee does not.  The importance of asset 
ownership derives from the fact that the willingness of an agent to undertake a non-
contractible investment (say, exertion of effort or investment in human capital), 
which is specific to the asset, depends on who owns the asset.  The parties to a 
relation are seen as being in a bargaining situation, each having an outside option.  
Given this, the division of the surplus from the relation will depend on who owns 
the alienable assets in the relation, since the pattern of ownership will influence the 
parties’ outside options.12 In turn, the expectation of this division feeds back into the 
investments that the parties are willing to make.  Efficiency considerations then 
suggest that authority (i.e., ownership to the alienable assets) should be allocated to 
the agent who makes the most important (non-contractible) relation-specific 
investment.    
 This kind of reasoning may be utilized to get an understanding of the 
implications of knowledge assets for the boundaries of the firm.   Assume, therefore, 
a purely “knowledge-based” team, consisting of two agents and two knowledge 
assets.  In this team, the entrepreneur owns a knowledge asset that is “inside his 
head” (e.g., an entrepreneurial idea) and the other agent, the scientist, owns the only 
other asset in the relation which we may assume to be a patent.  Both assets are 
necessary to the create value in the relation, and they are (strictly) complementary, 
so that any asset is of zero value without the other. It is prohibitively costly to 
communicate the knowledge embodied in the entrepreneurial idea from the 
entrepreneur to the scientist, so it is effectively non-alienable.  Moreover, it is not 
possible to write a comprehensive contract, governing the use of the assets in all 
contingencies.  Given this, we may ask who should own the (alienable) patent 
which ⎯ in terms of incomplete contracts approach ⎯  is the same as asking who 
should own the firm.    
In this setting, if the entrepreneur makes an effort investment, that is, 
elaborates on his idea and creates extra value, the scientist can effect a hold-up on 
the entrepreneur, since the latter needs access to the patent to create value (and the 
contract is incomplete).  Of course, the reverse also holds, so that if the scientist 
makes an effort investment, for example, makes a spin-off patent, the entrepreneur 
                                                          
12  For example, if the employer owns all the alienable assets, the employee can still quit if he 
dislikes the employer’s orders (as in Alchian and Demsetz 1972), but he cannot take the assets 
with him, and the employer can ensure that if the employee leaves, somebody else can take over 
the job. 
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can hold-up the scientist by threatening to withdraw from the relation.  One can 
show (details in Hart and Moore 1990 and Brynjolfsson 1994) that because of the 
externality problem that the hold-up threat creates, every agent invests too little; 
specifically, each party invests to the point where the marginal cost of effort 
investment equals ½ of the marginal value (because they are assumed to split the 
extra surplus 50 : 50).  Suppose now that the entrepreneur owns both the patent and 
the entrepreneurial idea.  This will strengthen the entrepreneur’s incentives (the 
scientist cannot hold him up anymore) and it will leave the scientist’s incentives 
unaffected. Rational agents will choose this arrangement. 
The conclusion is that it is possible to speak of the boundaries of the firm in 
terms of ownership ⎯ even in a situation where all relevant productive assets are 
knowledge assets.  However, this does not yet demonstrate the point made earlier, 
namely that authority and ownership somehow go together.  This issue can be 
addressed, however, by assuming that one of the agents, the entrepreneur, have 
decisive information (in the sense discussed earlier).  While it argued earlier that it 
would be rational to give this agent decision rights amounting to authority, should 
he also be an owner?  Consider a bigger  “knowledge-based” firm where there is a 
group of n scientists (n >1) who each owns a patent. The entrepreneur, who again 
comes equipped with a non-alienable entrepreneurial idea, aggregates information 
from the messages of the scientists and directs their efforts.  His knowledge is 
decisive in the sense that without it, all actions of the other agents produce zero 
value.  The entrepreneur  may improve on this decisive knowledge.  Each agent 
needs access to his own patent and to the entrepreneur’s direction in order to be 
productive.  Given these assumptions, the hold-up problem is still present: Any one 
of the scientists can hold up the entrepreneur on his investment, leading the 
entrepreneur to choose inefficient investment levels.  However, if the entrepreneur 
is given ownership to the alienable assets, that is, the patents, the hold-up problem 
disappears. Rational agents will choose this arrangement. 
Are Coordination Mechanisms Malleable?A Misesian Perspective 
 Thus far, it has been argued that it is possible to provide rational reasons for 
authority, for ownership-based notions of the boundaries of the firm, and for 
authority and ownership being linked, even in Hayekian settings.  This prompts the 
question of whether there are other necessary “links” between organizational 
elements.   Here it is pertinent to turn once more to Mises’ work, in particular Mises’ 
work on political economy and comparative systems.  
 As Mises (1949: 709) explained, there are inherent contradictions involved in 
”playing market,” which we may broadly interpret as the introduction of pricing in 
the context of hierarchy. With reference to various socialist schemes of his day that 
tried to preserve some market relations while eliminating capital and financial 
markets, Mises argued that these schemes would be unworkable.   To an important 
extent this is a matter of the sheer impossibility of rational calculation when asset 
markets are eliminated.  But Mises also placed much emphasis on property rights 
and ownership issues (particularly Mises 1936).  Thus, he was aware that the 
concentration of ultimate decision-making rights ⎯ that is, ownership ⎯ in the 
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hands of a central planning board would dilute the incentives of socialist managers.  
While planning authorities could (and according to the more “sophisticated” 
schemes of the day, should) delegate rights to make production and investment 
decisions to managers, these rights could not be used in a rational manner.  First, 
since managers could not be sure that they would not be overruled by the planning 
authorities, they were not likely to take a long view, notably in their investment 
decisions.  Moreover, since managers were not the ultimate owners, they were not 
the full residual claimants of their decisions and, hence, would not make efficient 
decisions. Thus, in addition to his pure calculation argument, Mises also put 
forward property rights arguments for why the attempt to ”play market” under 
socialism would not be workable.  
 Firms have the great advantage relative to socialist planning boards that they 
may to a much larger extent rely on the prices of outside markets.  Thus, the 
Misesian calculation problem, while helping to explain the sizes of firms (Klein 
1996),  does not imply that firm organization is “impossible.” However, some of the 
property rights insights into socialism also apply to firms.  In particular, a good deal 
of recent analytical energies have been devoted to the commitment problems of 
delegation in firms (e.g., Williamson 1985; Miller 1992; Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 
1999). Transaction cost economist, Oliver Williamson (1996) has referred to these 
kinds of problems with his concept of the ”impossibility of (efficient) selective 
intervention.” The main problem is that incentives are diluted.   This is because the 
option to intervene ”… can be exercised both for good cause (to support expected 
net gains) and for bad (to support the subgoals of the intervenor)” (Williamson 1996: 
150-151). Promises to only intervene for good cause can never be credible, 
Williamson argues, because they are not enforceable.  Although Williamson may be 
going to far, a main conclusion in this literature is indeed that credible delegation 
may be very hard to accomplish, since reneging on a promise to delegate will in 
many cases be very tempting and those to whom rights are delegated anticipate 
this.13  An immediate implication of this kind of reasoning is that emulating market 
                                                          
13  In a recent treatment, the problem is stated in the following way (cf. Baker, Gibbons and 
Murphy 1999). Assume that a subordinate initiates a project, where a “project” may refer to 
many different types of decisions or clusters of decisions. Assume further that the manager has 
information that is necessary to perform an assessment of the project, but that he decides 
upfront to ratify any project that the subordinate proposes.  Effectively, this amounts to full 
informal delegation of the rights to initiate and ratify projects  ⎯ ”informal,” because the formal 
right to ratify is still in the hands of the manager and because that right cannot be allocated to 
the subordinate through a court-enforceable contract (cf. Williamson 1996).   Because the 
subordinate values being given freedom, this will induce more effort in searching for new 
projects (Aghion and Tirole 1997).  The expected benefits of these increased efforts may 
overwhelm the expected costs from bad projects that the manager has to ratify.  However, the 
problem is that because the manager has information about the state of a project (”bad” or 
”good”), he may be tempted to renege on a promise to delegate decision authority, that is, 
intervene in a “selective” manner.  But if he overrules the subordinate, the latter will lose trust 
in him, holding back on effort.  Clearly, in this game a number of equilibria are feasible.  The 
particular equilibrium that emerges will be determined by the discount rate of the manager, the 
specific trigger strategy followed by the sub-ordinate (e.g., will he lose trust in the manager for 
all future periods if he is overruled?), and how much the manager values his reputation for not 
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organization inside firms, for example, by radically decentralizing the firm and 
allocating far-reaching decision rights to employees may be hard to accomplish in a 
successful manner. Unlike independent agents in markets, corporate employees 
never possess ultimate decision rights.  They are not full owners.  This means that 
those who possess ultimate decision rights can always overrule employees.  Thus, 
there are incentive limits to the extent to which market mechanims can be applied 
inside firms, and delegation, while not exactly a rare flower, is certainly a very 
delicate one.    
  Other means of introducing market mechanisms inside firms are also 
problematic, if for somewhat different reasons.  Thus, multi-task agency theory 
suggests that there are quite rational reasons for the “low-powered” incentives one 
typically observes inside firms (in contrast to the “high-powered” incentives of the 
marketplace) (Holmström and Milgrom 1991).  This is because managers wish 
employees to undertake multiple tasks, some of which may be very costly to 
observe and measure, but which may nevertheless be vital to the firm (e.g., sharing 
knowledge with colleagues, handling calling customers in a polite manner, etc.).   
Providing incentives that are only tied to those tasks that can be measured (at low 
cost) risks twisting efforts away from the costly-to-measure tasks.  These problems 
would appear to be particularly acute in Hayekian settings, because of dispersed 
knowledge.   
  Taken together the reasoning above suggests that coordination mechanisms 
are not simply combinable in an arbitrary fashion, contrary to the thrust of many 
recent writings on economic organization in the knowledge economy.  Ultimately, 
this is because authority and ownership will continue to be important in the 
knowledge economy, as argued earlier.   First, it has been argued that there is an 
inherent tension between ownership and delegated rights.  Second, in Hayekian 
settings, delegation is necessary. Delegation often needs to be backed up by a 
strengthening of incentives because of the agency problem.  However, under multi-
tasking, there are limits to how much incentives can be strengthened.   Thus, rather 
than being combinable at will, coordination mechanisms, such as authority, 
delegation, pricing, etc., tend to cluster in predictable ways.  This is an application 
of sorts on the level of the firm of Mises’ demonstration that the various elements 
that make up the capitalist market economy are complementary ones; one cannot 
simply take a subset of these away, say, unhampered capital markets, and substitute 
them with elements that are characteristic of a different system.14 In a similar 
manner, concentrated ownership, authority, circumscribed decision rights, and 
incentives that are less “powered” than those of the marketplace are all 
complementary elements of a system, namely, the firm, and they will continue to be 
so, even in the knowledge economy.  Thus, Misesian arguments help to demonstrate 
the continued viability of the “Coasian firm,” as against those critics who have 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
reneging relative to the benefits of reneging on a bad project (for details and extensions, see 
Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy 1999). 
14  See also Milgrom and Roberts (1990) for an important discussion of complementarities. 
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argued that it will wither under the impact of the increasing prevalence of Hayekian 
settings.  
IV. Conclusion 
 
The understanding of the dynamics of economic organization, such as what will 
happen to authority relations, the boundaries of firms and firms’ use of distinct 
coordination mechanisms, is a task of almost forbidding complexity.  Yet, a 
combination of organizational economics and Austrian insights, primarily 
represented by the works of Hayek and Mises, provides useful insights. The 
approach of this paper has been to try to distill some key assumptions and 
propositions that characterize much of this literature, and examine these in the light 
of organizational economics and Austrian economics.    
 Thus, it has been argued that much of the recent discussion of economic 
organization in the knowledge economy may be distilled into a basic assertion that 
the kind of knowledge that Hayek (1945) talked about represent an increasingly 
binding constraint on the exercise of authority, makes the boundaries of firms blur, 
and necessitates the use of multiple coordination instruments to efficiently utilize 
this knowledge.  To the extent that increasingly firm hierarchies do flatten, functions 
are spun-off in an attempt to improve incentives, delegation increases, etc., much of 
this may be interpreted using insights originally put forward by Hayek, as a 
number of writers have pointed out already (Ellig 1993; Gable and Ellig 1993; 
Ghoshal, Moran and Almeida-Costa 1997; Cowen and Parker 1997; Foss 1999).  
 On the other hand, while Austrian insights are useful for interpreting recent 
claims, these insights are also useful for understanding their reach.  In particular, 
Misesian insights are helpful here, and it may be argued that their is a certain 
imbalance in the above writings because of their neglect of these insights.  Thus, I 
have argued that Mises’ insights in entrepreneurship, property rights and the 
complementarity of elements in economic systems are useful ones for claiming a 
role for authority and the boundaries of firms, as well as for helping to uphold the 
notion that there are discrete organizational forms (e.g., firms, markets, and 
hybrids), and that coordination mechanisms cannot be combined arbitrarily. This 
strongly suggests that Austrian economics (still) has an important contribution to 
make to the study of economic organization; in particular, that important principles 
of efficient organization design can be derived from Misesian foundations. 
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